GNSS spoofing detection method based on the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA‑DOA) for single-antenna receivers

The application field of global navigation satellite systems continues to expand, and their security and stability have received widespread attention. Navigation spoofing has the characteristics of solid concealment and significant harm, posing a severe security threat to navigation systems. In current spoofing detection methods based on signal spatial correlation, multiple antennas/receivers or moving single antennas are required, which means high cost and complexity in implementation. To this end, we propose a spoofing detection method based on the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA-DOA) for single-antenna receivers. The essence of this method is to accurately estimate the IA-DOA between a pair of signals based on pseudorange observations and navigation information. The observation should be consistent with the prediction when there is no spoofing. Otherwise, due to geometric and kinematic differences between the navigation satellite and the spoofer or the pulling off of the spoofing, the spoofing may disrupt the consistency between the observation and prediction of IA-DOA. Theoretically, since the proposed method makes no assumptions about spoofing, it can detect multi-antenna spoofing. We conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the impact of different parameters on spoofing detection performance and conducted experimental verification and evaluation through open datasets. The results show that the method proposed in this article can effectively detect multi-antenna spoofing, reducing the requirements of receiver antennas for spoofing detection methods based on signal spatial correlation.