Values for Restricted Games with Externalities
We study cooperative games in which some of the coalitions are not viable and in addition, there are externalities among the feasible coalitions. These games are called here restricted partition function form games. For this class of games, two extensions of the Shapley value are proposed and charac...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Group decision and negotiation 2024-04, Vol.33 (2), p.351-369 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | We study cooperative games in which some of the coalitions are not viable and in addition, there are externalities among the feasible coalitions. These games are called here restricted partition function form games. For this class of games, two extensions of the Shapley value are proposed and characterized. |
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ISSN: | 0926-2644 1572-9907 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10726-023-09864-8 |