Generalizations of Sobolev’s Consistency and Values for TU-Games
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vilnius, pp 151–153, 1973) axiomatized the well-known Shapley value by means of consistency property with reference to a specifically chosen reduced game. The goal of this paper is to generalize Sobolev...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Internet) 2021-06, Vol.9 (2), p.343-357 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vilnius, pp 151–153, 1973) axiomatized the well-known Shapley value by means of consistency property with reference to a specifically chosen reduced game. The goal of this paper is to generalize Sobolev’s consistency approach to the class of efficient, symmetric and linear values. |
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ISSN: | 2194-668X 2194-6698 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s40305-019-00279-4 |