Individual Stability of Pareto Equilibrium of Threats and Counterthreats in a Coalition Differential Game without Side Payments

Individual Stability of Pareto Equilibrium of Threats and Counterthreats in a Coalition Differential Game without Side Payments

The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Doklady. Mathematics 2023-12, Vol.108 (Suppl 1), p.S50-S55
Hauptverfasser: Zhukovskiy, V. I., Kudryavtsev, K. N., Zhukovskaya, L. V., Stabulit, I. S.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Differential games
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Stability
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.
ISSN:1064-5624
1531-8362
DOI:10.1134/S1064562423600781