Dynamics of manipulation in voting, veto and plurality

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to artificial intelligence. The main focus of paper is the analysis of dynamics of manipulation in voting rules like plurality and veto. An important technical issue that arises is manipulation of voting schemes: a voter may be able to improve the outcome (with respect to his own preferences) by reporting his preferences incorrectly. We consider scenarios where voters cannot coordinate their actions, but are allowed to change their vote after observing the current outcome, as is often the case both in offline committees and in online voting. Voters are allowed to change their votes if they can get their desirable results, we have worked on veto and plurality rule with the small number of candidates and voters. We also used different moves for analysing the dynamics of voting system and concluded different results based on different types of moves (both manipulative and non-manipulative). We also defined a new tie breaking rule “Typicographical rule” and according to our observation it works better than the lexicographical rule.