An inexact-penalty method for GNE seeking in games with dynamic agents

We consider a network of autonomous agents whose outputs are actions in a game with coupled constraints. In such network scenarios, agents seek to minimize coupled cost functions using distributed information while satisfying the coupled constraints. Current methods consider the small class of multi...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on control of network systems 2023-12, Vol.10 (4), p.1-12
Hauptverfasser: Romano, Andrew R., Pavel, Lacra
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext bestellen
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We consider a network of autonomous agents whose outputs are actions in a game with coupled constraints. In such network scenarios, agents seek to minimize coupled cost functions using distributed information while satisfying the coupled constraints. Current methods consider the small class of multi-integrator agents using primal-dual methods. These methods can only ensure constraint satisfaction in steady-state. In contrast, we propose an inexact penalty method using a barrier function for nonlinear agents with equilibrium-independent passive dynamics. We show that these dynamics converge to an \varepsilon-GNE while satisfying the constraints for all time, not only in steady-state. We develop these dynamics in both the full-information and partial-information settings. In the partial-information setting, dynamic estimates of the others' actions are used to make decisions and are updated through local communication. Applications to optical networks, velocity synchronization of flexible robots and wind farm optimization are provided.
ISSN:2325-5870
2372-2533
DOI:10.1109/TCNS.2023.3259468