On Proving Mabrus and Zorgs
An unfortunate disconnect exists in modern evidence scholarship. On one hand, a rich literature has explored the process of legal proof in general and legal standards of proof in particular. Call this the "macro level" of legal proof. On the other hand, a rich literature has explored the a...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Vanderbilt law review 2023-11, Vol.76 (6), p.1653-1680 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | An unfortunate disconnect exists in modern evidence scholarship. On one hand, a rich literature has explored the process of legal proof in general and legal standards of proof in particular. Call this the "macro level" of legal proof. On the other hand, a rich literature has explored the admissibility rules that regulate the admission or exclusion of particular types of evidence (such as hearsay, character evidence, expert testimony, and so on). Call this the "micro level" of legal proof. Little attention, however, has focused on how the issues discussed in these two distinct strands of evidence scholarship intertwine. One important connection concerns the process and the standards for proving admissibility or exclusion when admissibility or exclusion depends on disputed facts. |
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ISSN: | 0042-2533 1942-9886 |