Why North Korean Nuclear Blackmail is Unlikely

Nuclear-armed North Korea is now expanding and diversifying its arsenal and delivery systems, including the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. This generates fears that Pyongyang intends to use nuclear coercion to force its political agenda upon South Korea while negating the "nuclear umbr...

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Veröffentlicht in:Asia-Pacific issues 2023-11 (161), p.1-8
1. Verfasser: Roy, Denny
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Nuclear-armed North Korea is now expanding and diversifying its arsenal and delivery systems, including the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. This generates fears that Pyongyang intends to use nuclear coercion to force its political agenda upon South Korea while negating the "nuclear umbrella" provided by Seoul's ally the United States. Even the expanded nuclear arsenal, however, is unlikely to embolden Pyongyang either to demand specific concessions from Seoul during peacetime on pain of a nuclear attack, or to employ conventional military attacks more aggressively under the cover provided by North Korea's nuclear weapons. Absent an attempt by Seoul and Washington to topple the Kim regime through invasion, nuclear threats by Pyongyang lack credibility From Pyongyang's standpoint, North Korea's nuclear weapons strategy is explainable as part of an essentially self-defensive posture. The US and South Korean governments should therefore avoid policies that might unnecessarily push Pyongyang toward more aggressive actions.
ISSN:1522-0966