Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow f...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2023-08, Vol.61 (2), p.385-411 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 411 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 385 |
| container_title | Social choice and welfare |
| container_volume | 61 |
| creator | Hong, Miho Kim, Semin |
| description | This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow from unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains. Furthermore, we identify a property of preference domains that completely characterizes dictatorial domains within sparsely connected domains. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2849394082</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2849394082</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-39f9cfbbdf82e87ef48230eedb1f9792e4d83976382dfb907feac3e7e0b60f83</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE9LxDAUxIMouK5-AU8Fz9GXpG3Soyz-WVjwsoK3kKYvkqVNa9IV9tvbtcLePL3D_GaGN4TcMrhnAPIhAYiioMAFBZYXkoozsmC54JQz-XFOFsBkSZlk-SW5SmkHAJznakHW78EE3_nxkJnQZG1vTZv5YDGM_hsz23eDGX3t2yPhQ5YGExO2h0kJAe2ITdb0nfEhXZMLZ9qEN393SbbPT9vVK928vaxXjxtqRQkjFZWrrKvrximOSqLLFReA2NTMVbLimDdKVLIUijeurkA6NFagRKhLcEosyd0cO8T-a49p1Lt-H8PUqLnKK1HlMAUuCZ8pG_uUIjo9RN-ZeNAM9HExPS-mp8X072JaTKZsNuH0nE8niypKKYsS5ISIGUmTGD4xntr_Cf4Bkk56Eg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2849394082</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains</title><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>SpringerNature Journals</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>EBSCOhost Political Science Complete</source><creator>Hong, Miho ; Kim, Semin</creator><creatorcontrib>Hong, Miho ; Kim, Semin</creatorcontrib><description>This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow from unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains. Furthermore, we identify a property of preference domains that completely characterizes dictatorial domains within sparsely connected domains.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0176-1714</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1432-217X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Compatibility ; Dictators ; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Efficiency ; Election results ; Function ; Game Theory ; Incentives ; International Political Economy ; Original Paper ; Preferences ; Presidential elections ; Public Finance ; Social and Behav. Sciences ; Social choice ; Social Policy ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion</subject><ispartof>Social choice and welfare, 2023-08, Vol.61 (2), p.385-411</ispartof><rights>The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2023. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-39f9cfbbdf82e87ef48230eedb1f9792e4d83976382dfb907feac3e7e0b60f83</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,12845,27924,27925,41488,42557,51319</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hong, Miho</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kim, Semin</creatorcontrib><title>Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains</title><title>Social choice and welfare</title><addtitle>Soc Choice Welf</addtitle><description>This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow from unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains. Furthermore, we identify a property of preference domains that completely characterizes dictatorial domains within sparsely connected domains.</description><subject>Compatibility</subject><subject>Dictators</subject><subject>Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Efficiency</subject><subject>Election results</subject><subject>Function</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>International Political Economy</subject><subject>Original Paper</subject><subject>Preferences</subject><subject>Presidential elections</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Social and Behav. Sciences</subject><subject>Social choice</subject><subject>Social Policy</subject><subject>Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion</subject><issn>0176-1714</issn><issn>1432-217X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE9LxDAUxIMouK5-AU8Fz9GXpG3Soyz-WVjwsoK3kKYvkqVNa9IV9tvbtcLePL3D_GaGN4TcMrhnAPIhAYiioMAFBZYXkoozsmC54JQz-XFOFsBkSZlk-SW5SmkHAJznakHW78EE3_nxkJnQZG1vTZv5YDGM_hsz23eDGX3t2yPhQ5YGExO2h0kJAe2ITdb0nfEhXZMLZ9qEN393SbbPT9vVK928vaxXjxtqRQkjFZWrrKvrximOSqLLFReA2NTMVbLimDdKVLIUijeurkA6NFagRKhLcEosyd0cO8T-a49p1Lt-H8PUqLnKK1HlMAUuCZ8pG_uUIjo9RN-ZeNAM9HExPS-mp8X072JaTKZsNuH0nE8niypKKYsS5ISIGUmTGD4xntr_Cf4Bkk56Eg</recordid><startdate>20230801</startdate><enddate>20230801</enddate><creator>Hong, Miho</creator><creator>Kim, Semin</creator><general>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8C1</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PSYQQ</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20230801</creationdate><title>Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains</title><author>Hong, Miho ; Kim, Semin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c360t-39f9cfbbdf82e87ef48230eedb1f9792e4d83976382dfb907feac3e7e0b60f83</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2023</creationdate><topic>Compatibility</topic><topic>Dictators</topic><topic>Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Efficiency</topic><topic>Election results</topic><topic>Function</topic><topic>Game Theory</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>International Political Economy</topic><topic>Original Paper</topic><topic>Preferences</topic><topic>Presidential elections</topic><topic>Public Finance</topic><topic>Social and Behav. Sciences</topic><topic>Social choice</topic><topic>Social Policy</topic><topic>Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Hong, Miho</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kim, Semin</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Social Sciences Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Public Health Database</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Healthcare Administration Database</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>One Business (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest One Psychology</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Social choice and welfare</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Hong, Miho</au><au>Kim, Semin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains</atitle><jtitle>Social choice and welfare</jtitle><stitle>Soc Choice Welf</stitle><date>2023-08-01</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>61</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>385</spage><epage>411</epage><pages>385-411</pages><issn>0176-1714</issn><eissn>1432-217X</eissn><abstract>This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow from unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains. Furthermore, we identify a property of preference domains that completely characterizes dictatorial domains within sparsely connected domains.</abstract><cop>Berlin/Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3</doi><tpages>27</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0176-1714 |
| ispartof | Social choice and welfare, 2023-08, Vol.61 (2), p.385-411 |
| issn | 0176-1714 1432-217X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2849394082 |
| source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Compatibility Dictators Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Efficiency Election results Function Game Theory Incentives International Political Economy Original Paper Preferences Presidential elections Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social choice Social Policy Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion |
| title | Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T14%3A53%3A39IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Unanimity%20and%20local%20incentive%20compatibility%20in%20sparsely%20connected%20domains&rft.jtitle=Social%20choice%20and%20welfare&rft.au=Hong,%20Miho&rft.date=2023-08-01&rft.volume=61&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=385&rft.epage=411&rft.pages=385-411&rft.issn=0176-1714&rft.eissn=1432-217X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2849394082%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2849394082&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |