Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow f...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2023-08, Vol.61 (2), p.385-411 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow from unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains. Furthermore, we identify a property of preference domains that completely characterizes dictatorial domains within sparsely connected domains. |
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ISSN: | 0176-1714 1432-217X |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3 |