Defense Mechanism to Generate IPS Rules from Honeypot Logs and Its Application to Log4Shell Attack and Its Variants

The vulnerability of Apache Log4j, Log4Shell, is known for its widespread impact; many attacks that exploit Log4Shell use obfuscated attack patterns, and Log4Shell has revealed the importance of addressing such variants. However, there is no research which focuses on the response to variants. In thi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Electronics (Basel) 2023-07, Vol.12 (14), p.3177
Hauptverfasser: Yamamoto, Yudai, Yamaguchi, Shingo
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The vulnerability of Apache Log4j, Log4Shell, is known for its widespread impact; many attacks that exploit Log4Shell use obfuscated attack patterns, and Log4Shell has revealed the importance of addressing such variants. However, there is no research which focuses on the response to variants. In this paper, we propose a defense system that can protect against variants as well as known attacks. The proposed defense system can be divided into three parts: honeypots, machine learning, and rule generation. Honeypots are used to collect data, which can be used to obtain information about the latest attacks. In machine learning, the data collected by honeypots are used to determine whether it is an attack or not. It generates rules that can be applied to an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) to block access that is determined to be an attack. To investigate the effectiveness of this system, an experiment was conducted using test data collected by honeypots, with the conventional method using Suricata, an IPS, as a comparison. Experimental results show that the discrimination performance of the proposed method against variant attacks is about 50% higher than that of the conventional method, indicating that the proposed method is an effective method against variant attacks.
ISSN:2079-9292
2079-9292
DOI:10.3390/electronics12143177