Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

In this study, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. It is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness requirements. We alternatively propose a simple and natural mecha...

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Veröffentlicht in:Social choice and welfare 2023-05, Vol.60 (4), p.647-669
Hauptverfasser: Inoue, Fumiya, Yamamura, Hirofumi
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:In this study, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly divisible resource among agents with single-dipped preferences. It is known that any efficient and strategy-proof rule violates several fairness requirements. We alternatively propose a simple and natural mechanism, in which each agent announces only whether he or she demands a resource and the resource is divided equally among the agents who demand it. We show that any Nash equilibrium allocation of our mechanism belongs to the equal-division core. In addition, we show that our mechanism is Cournot stable. In other words, from any message profile, any path of better-replies converges to a Nash equilibrium.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1