The opportunities and costs of highly involved organizational buyers

This research investigates the impact of an organizational buyer’s product involvement on the customer firm’s and supplier’s financial outcomes. The results suggest that highly involved organizational buyers are willing to pay more, which benefits the supplier, but they are also perceived by the sup...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 2023-03, Vol.51 (2), p.480-501
Hauptverfasser: McClure, Colleen E., Lawrence, Justin M., Arnold, Todd J., Scheer, Lisa K.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This research investigates the impact of an organizational buyer’s product involvement on the customer firm’s and supplier’s financial outcomes. The results suggest that highly involved organizational buyers are willing to pay more, which benefits the supplier, but they are also perceived by the supplier as having greater expertise in negotiations, which benefits the customer. In Study 1, the authors examine the effects of buyer product involvement using a survey of organizational buyers matched with profit data from their supplier. The findings suggest that the prevailing mechanism that drives the effects of buyer product involvement is contingent upon different customer and supplier levers. Study 2 examines the theorized mechanisms via a second survey and an experiment. This research contributes to literatures on buying and negotiations by revealing the importance of considering the potential effects of a buyer’s product involvement. Suppliers can leverage a more highly involved buyer by developing strong connections with the focal product; customers should encourage their buyers to be highly involved and leverage their knowledge of the market but limit their influence within the customer firm.
ISSN:0092-0703
1552-7824
DOI:10.1007/s11747-022-00859-6