Congress's Anti-Removal Power

Statutory restrictions on presidential removal of agency leadership enable agencies to act independently from the White House. Yet since 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court has held two times that such restrictions are unconstitutional precisely because they prevent the President from controlling policymak...

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Veröffentlicht in:Vanderbilt law review 2023-01, Vol.76 (1), p.1-81
Hauptverfasser: Nielson, Aaron L, Walker, Christopher J
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Statutory restrictions on presidential removal of agency leadership enable agencies to act independently from the White House. Yet since 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court has held two times that such restrictions are unconstitutional precisely because they prevent the President from controlling policymaking within the executive branch. Recognizing that a supermajority of the Justices now appears to reject or at least limit the principle from Humphrey's Executor that Congress may prevent the President from removing agency officials based on policy disagreement, scholars increasingly predict that the Court will soon further weaken agency independence if not jettison it altogether.
ISSN:0042-2533
1942-9886