For Canada, Insularism Leads to a Lost Opportunity in the Arctic and Asia

For decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to-if not in excess of-any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.2 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy exploration and development.4 Finland and Iceland, too, have sought deeper ties with Asian states, including India, on high north matters such as science, research, and education.5 For the Nordic states, both a desirability and an inevitability inherent in their approach to engagement with Asian actors carry with them a transformative potential toward Arctic affairs.6 The government of Canada, conversely, has not pursued a policy of cooperation with any Asian state on Arctic affairs, preferring instead to work with its traditional U.S. and European partners on issues ranging from governance to regional security.7 This essay examines Canada's failure to integrate Asian actors in the Arctic into its Arctic policy and activities as well as the implications for Canadian policy, not just toward the