Afghanistan and Mali: German “Anti-Withdrawal” Strategy?

Against the backdrop of the modern Cold War, the instability threats the sources of which are located in the conflictprone countries of Asia and Africa have not disappeared. One of the key tendencies is the structures of international terrorism in Western Africa, Horn of Africa, Near and partly Middle East being still in force. The article explores Germany’s attempts to keep the strategic presence in Afghanistan and Mali in the context of previous efforts to resolve armed conflicts here. The choice is due to the FRG being in a position of moving towards the role of a full-fledged global player in political and military spheres. The “rising” power becomes especially susceptible both to the risks of instability projected on it and its partners, and to the loss of strategic influence in various regions of the world. The author explores in a comparative way different aspects of German participation in the missions in Afghanistan (ISAF, then “Resolute Support”) and Mali (EUTM Mali and MINUSMA in parallel). The paper highlights political and military factors which determine the scale and forms of the Bundeswehr usage in the peacekeeping sphere during different stages of the resolution process. In Mali, Germany has tried to take into account and correct the mistakes in security sector reform conducted in Afghanistan. But at the same time, there were quite a few “narrow places” of EUTM Mali activity with FRG’s role as a framework nation. The first factor of German positions’ strategic vulnerability is dependence on a partner fully engaged in anti-terrorist combat operations. The second one is the critical perception of German efforts by the forces which have come to power in Afghanistan (Taliban) and Mali (local military officers) and have preferred the nationalization of armed conflict resolution. In this regard, the article concludes about German “anti-withdrawal” strategy.