Personal Bankruptcy Laws and Corporate Policies

In this article we examine whether and how changes in personal bankruptcy laws, viewed as a shock to employees’ expected personal wealth, affect corporate policies. Following a reform in personal bankruptcy laws that limits individuals’ access to bankruptcy protection, firms more affected by this re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 2020-11, Vol.55 (7), p.2397-2428
Hauptverfasser: Chen, Yi-Wen, Halford, Joseph T., Hsu, Hung-Chia Scott, Lin, Chu-Bin
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:In this article we examine whether and how changes in personal bankruptcy laws, viewed as a shock to employees’ expected personal wealth, affect corporate policies. Following a reform in personal bankruptcy laws that limits individuals’ access to bankruptcy protection, firms more affected by this regulation reform increase labor costs, reduce investment, and engage in less risk taking. The effects are stronger when employees have more bargaining power. Furthermore, firms in industries characterized by high unemployment risk reduce leverage. These results support the view that firms choose more conservative policies to mitigate employees’ expected welfare losses.
ISSN:0022-1090
1756-6916
DOI:10.1017/S0022109019000620