Active representative bureaucracy, homogeneous organizational context, and deviation from official policy among street-level bureaucrats

Studies of representative bureaucracy have shown how minority groups are often underrepresented in public agencies. They also indicate that the match between the backgrounds of the bureaucrats and their clients has a strong effect on minority groups. Less attention has been devoted to the question o...

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Veröffentlicht in:Australian journal of public administration 2022-06, Vol.81 (2), p.303-319
Hauptverfasser: Diab, Hadeel, Cohen, Nissim
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Studies of representative bureaucracy have shown how minority groups are often underrepresented in public agencies. They also indicate that the match between the backgrounds of the bureaucrats and their clients has a strong effect on minority groups. Less attention has been devoted to the question of what happens when street level bureaucrats (SLBs) from a minority group serve clients in organizations all of whose clients belong to the same minority group as the SLBs. How do they behave when the policies they must implement are inconsistent with their collective moral values? What dilemmas do they experience, and how do they address them? We explore these questions using the case of Arab civics teachers in Arab schools in Israel, organizations with a homogeneous work environment of minorities. Our findings contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing the importance of the organizational context. In a homogeneous work environment, it is easier for SLBs to deviate from formal policy. While they must still consider "disobeying costs" imposed by the state, the organizational mixture strengthens the legitimacy among clients, colleagues, and direct managers to deviate from official public policy.
ISSN:0313-6647
1467-8500
DOI:10.1111/1467-8500.12512