Hierarchical Games with Feedback under the Assumption of Benevolence of the Lower-Level Player

Hierarchical Games with Feedback under the Assumption of Benevolence of the Lower-Level Player

A new optimality principle is proposed that generalizes the Stackelberg equilibrium principle. Its connection with the classical definition is investigated. The technique of working with the new definition is discussed. As an example, solutions are found in two hierarchical games with feedback.

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Veröffentlicht in:Automation and remote control 2022-03, Vol.83 (3), p.437-452
1. Verfasser: Gorelov, M. A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
CAE) and Design
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control
Optimization
Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD
Control
Feedback
Game theory
Games
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Mechanical Engineering
Mechatronics
Robotics
Systems Theory
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:A new optimality principle is proposed that generalizes the Stackelberg equilibrium principle. Its connection with the classical definition is investigated. The technique of working with the new definition is discussed. As an example, solutions are found in two hierarchical games with feedback.
ISSN:0005-1179
1608-3032
DOI:10.1134/S0005117922030110