III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs
Abstract According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime cand...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2022-04, Vol.122 (1), p.47-69 |
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| creator | Fabre, Cécile |
| description | Abstract
According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on the truth-value or valence of beliefs. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/arisoc/aoab015 |
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According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on the truth-value or valence of beliefs.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0066-7374</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9264</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoab015</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>African Americans ; Analysis ; Beliefs ; Gender ; Society ; Stereotype (Psychology) ; Stereotypes ; Virtue ; Virtues</subject><ispartof>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2022-04, Vol.122 (1), p.47-69</ispartof><rights>2022 The Aristotelian Society 2022</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2022 Oxford University Press</rights><rights>2022 The Aristotelian Society</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2955-eb838c5258743e5ba6a05d322d0e2d062e617b253b24f2b3a22bac8b170e75fa3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2955-eb838c5258743e5ba6a05d322d0e2d062e617b253b24f2b3a22bac8b170e75fa3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1584,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Fabre, Cécile</creatorcontrib><title>III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs</title><title>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</title><description>Abstract
According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on the truth-value or valence of beliefs.</description><subject>African Americans</subject><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Beliefs</subject><subject>Gender</subject><subject>Society</subject><subject>Stereotype (Psychology)</subject><subject>Stereotypes</subject><subject>Virtue</subject><subject>Virtues</subject><issn>0066-7374</issn><issn>1467-9264</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>TOX</sourceid><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkM9Kw0AQxhdRsFavngOeBNPun2w2OdaqNVCqoOIxTDabsiXNxt0EtCcfwif0SVxJD96cYRgYft8M8yF0TvCE4JRNwWpn5BQMFJjwAzQiUSzClMbRIRphHMehYCI6RifObbCPOIlGaJVl2ffn1415B9dpGbxa06zdVbAyTfjU9lab3gUL1SgLtd5Bp03jAmjK4BGs5_vaX92pMrhWtVaVO0VHFdROne37GL3c3T7P78PlwyKbz5ahpCnnoSoSlkhOeSIipngBMWBeMkpLrHzFVMVEFJSzgkYVLRhQWoBMCiKwErwCNkYXw97WmrdeuS7fmN42_mTu_xWcJJQxT00Gag21ynVTmc6C9FmqrZamUZX285mgIuWM_RVIa5yzqspbq7dgP3KC81-T88HkfG-yF1wOAtO3_7E_ltyAbg</recordid><startdate>20220401</startdate><enddate>20220401</enddate><creator>Fabre, Cécile</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>TOX</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>AABKS</scope><scope>ABSDQ</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PADUT</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20220401</creationdate><title>III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs</title><author>Fabre, Cécile</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2955-eb838c5258743e5ba6a05d322d0e2d062e617b253b24f2b3a22bac8b170e75fa3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>African Americans</topic><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Beliefs</topic><topic>Gender</topic><topic>Society</topic><topic>Stereotype (Psychology)</topic><topic>Stereotypes</topic><topic>Virtue</topic><topic>Virtues</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Fabre, Cécile</creatorcontrib><collection>Oxford Journals Open Access Collection</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Philosophy Collection</collection><collection>Philosophy Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>Research Library China</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Fabre, Cécile</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs</atitle><jtitle>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</jtitle><date>2022-04-01</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>122</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>47</spage><epage>69</epage><pages>47-69</pages><issn>0066-7374</issn><eissn>1467-9264</eissn><abstract>Abstract
According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on the truth-value or valence of beliefs.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/arisoc/aoab015</doi><tpages>23</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2022-04, Vol.122 (1), p.47-69 |
| issn | 0066-7374 1467-9264 |
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| source | Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | African Americans Analysis Beliefs Gender Society Stereotype (Psychology) Stereotypes Virtue Virtues |
| title | III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs |
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