III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs

Abstract According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime cand...

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Veröffentlicht in:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2022-04, Vol.122 (1), p.47-69
1. Verfasser: Fabre, Cécile
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Abstract According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on the truth-value or valence of beliefs.
ISSN:0066-7374
1467-9264
DOI:10.1093/arisoc/aoab015