Why not LF for false belief reasoning?

Why not LF for false belief reasoning?

We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem nece...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Behavioral and brain sciences 2002-12, Vol.25 (6), p.682-683
Hauptverfasser: de Villiers, Jill G., de Villiers, Peter A.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit reasoning about false beliefs.
ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X02310124