Spoiler Susceptibility in Multi-District Party Elections

Electoral spoilers are such agents that there exists a coalition of agents whose total gain when a putative spoiler is eliminated exceeds that spoiler's share in the election outcome. So far spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily in the context of single-winner electoral systems. We consider this problem in the context of multi-district party elections. We introduce a formal measure of a party's excess electoral impact, treating "spoilership" as a manner of degree. This approach allows us to compare multi-winner social choice rules according to their degree of spoiler susceptibility. We present experimental results, as well as analytical results for toy models, for seven classical rules (\(k\)-Borda, Chamberlin--Courant, Harmonic-Borda, Jefferson--D'Hondt, PAV, SNTV, and STV). Since the probabilistic models commonly used in computational social choice have been developed for non-party elections, we extend them to be able to generate multi-district party elections.