Loss aversion in taste-based employee discrimination: Evidence from a choice experiment

Using a choice experiment, we test whether taste-based employee discrimination against ethnic minorities is susceptible to loss aversion. In line with empirical evidence from previous research, our results indicate that introducing a hypothetical wage penalty for discriminatory choice behaviour lowers discrimination and that higher penalties have a greater effect. Most notably, we find that the propensity to discriminate is significantly lower when this penalty is loss-framed rather than gain-framed. From a policy perspective, it could therefore be more effective to financially penalise taste-based discriminators than to incentivise them not to discriminate. •Participant preferences reveal ethnic, taste-based employee discrimination.•Preferences reverse when a wage penalty for discriminatory behaviour is introduced.•The propensity to discriminate is lower when the penalty is loss- vs. gain-framed.•Penalising said discrimination is more effective than rewarding non-discrimination.