Dissecting bankruptcy frictions
How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the United States? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find large bankruptcy inefficiencies, mainly due to excess dela...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial economics 2021-12, Vol.142 (3), p.975-1000 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the United States? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find large bankruptcy inefficiencies, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy’s indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small. |
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ISSN: | 0304-405X 1879-2774 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.014 |