Challenging the Power of the Prosecution? The First Phase of the Establishment of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (Kowigongjikchabŏmjoesusach'ŏ) in the Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea has shown a strong political will to develop its anti-corruption capacities. Research argues that corruption has been - and still is - an issue for the Korean political system before and after its democratization. Even after substantial legal developments in the anti-corruption...

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Veröffentlicht in:Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 2021-01, Vol.54 (2), p.279-300
1. Verfasser: Domning, Gwendolyn
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The Republic of Korea has shown a strong political will to develop its anti-corruption capacities. Research argues that corruption has been - and still is - an issue for the Korean political system before and after its democratization. Even after substantial legal developments in the anti-corruption field, trust in state institutions and actors has not improved much. The Korean parliament decided in 2019 on the creation of a permanent Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) in hopes of eradicating corruption. The CIO is an independent institution in charge of investigating and indicting cases of corruption committed by high-level officials, with a special focus on law professionals. After many controversies and some revisions, it started operating in January 2021. In the context of studying the role and development of anti-corruption laws in the world, research on anti-corruption institutions can contribute to our understanding of corruption in context. In this article, the creation of anti-corruption agencies is seen as part of state legitimacy building process. How is the CIO, which aims to reduce corruption, contributing to state legitimacy? Looking at performance and process-based legitimacy, the article centers its analysis on the first version of the CIO and argues that the institution provides new anti-corruption ‘services’ on one side and strengthens state accountability mechanisms on the other. First, institutional analysis shows that new capacities are added to the state-led anti-corruption activity field, mainly limited investigation, and indictment rights. Second, context analysis focusing on corruption scandals involving law professionals argues that the government builds process legitimacy by being responsive to public criticism and pushing for the creation of the CIO.
ISSN:0506-7286
DOI:10.5771/0506-7286-2021-2-279