Decentralized Resilient H Load Frequency Control for Cyber-Physical Power Systems Under DoS Attacks

This paper designs a decentralized resilient H_{\infty} load frequency control (LFC) scheme for multi-area cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs). Under the network-based control framework, the sampled measurements are transmitted through the communication networks, which may be attacked by energy-lim...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE/CAA journal of automatica sinica 2021-11, Vol.8 (11), p.1737-1751
Hauptverfasser: Zhao, Xin, Zou, Suli, Ma, Zhongjing
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper designs a decentralized resilient H_{\infty} load frequency control (LFC) scheme for multi-area cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs). Under the network-based control framework, the sampled measurements are transmitted through the communication networks, which may be attacked by energy-limited denial-of-service (DoS) attacks with a characterization of the maximum count of continuous data losses (resilience index). Each area is controlled in a decentralized mode, and the impacts on one area from other areas via their interconnections are regarded as the additional load disturbance of this area. Then, the closed-loop LFC system of each area under DoS attacks is modeled as an aperiodic sampled-data control system with external disturbances. Under this modeling, a decentralized resilient H_{\infty} scheme is presented to design the state-feedback controllers with guaranteed H_{\infty} performance and resilience index based on a novel transmission interval-dependent loop functional method. When given the controllers, the proposed scheme can obtain a less conservative H_{\infty} performance and resilience index that the LFC system can tolerate. The effectiveness of the proposed LFC scheme is evaluated on a one-area CPPS and two three-area CPPSs under DoS attacks.
ISSN:2329-9266
2329-9274
DOI:10.1109/JAS.2021.1004162