Examining the Stock Price Effect of Corruption Risk in the Supply Chain

ABSTRACT Although corrupt practices in the supply chain are not rare, this topic seems neglected in the literature. This could potentially be because a supply chain focused framework is lacking, and therefore it is difficult to measure the true impact of such issues. Why, how, and how much does corr...

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Veröffentlicht in:Decision sciences 2021-08, Vol.52 (4), p.833-865
Hauptverfasser: Kim, Seongtae, Wagner, Stephan M.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:ABSTRACT Although corrupt practices in the supply chain are not rare, this topic seems neglected in the literature. This could potentially be because a supply chain focused framework is lacking, and therefore it is difficult to measure the true impact of such issues. Why, how, and how much does corruption damage the corresponding firm in the supply chain? Our study takes what we term a supply chain view of corruption, and then estimates the stock price effect of corruption from that point of view. We focus on kickbacks and bribery issues that may damage a target firm's reputation and its market value. In particular, we address firms’ corrupt practices from a sustainability risk perspective with the conceptualization of corruption risk (CR). Using an event study methodology, based on a sample of 315 CR cases in the United States, we find significant market penalties for allegations of the target firms’ CRs (triggers) and its subsequent issues (investigation, regulatory and resolution). However, the market penalties are largely driven by triggers, not by the subsequent issues. We further reveal that the stock market reacts more negatively to CRs that occur upstream with suppliers than downstream with customers. Therefore, target focal firms must be cautious with upstream–trigger CRs.
ISSN:0011-7315
1540-5915
DOI:10.1111/deci.12487