Why the professional practice of psychology requires a personalistic account of psychological phenomena

Concerns about the epistemological unity of psychology may be attributed to the plurality of outlooks and methods, as well as to an ostensible gap between scientific psychology and professional practice. Such a gap threatens the identity of psychology and also hinders the adequate development of its...

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Veröffentlicht in:Theory & psychology 2021-08, Vol.31 (4), p.573-591
1. Verfasser: Gaj, Nicolò
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Concerns about the epistemological unity of psychology may be attributed to the plurality of outlooks and methods, as well as to an ostensible gap between scientific psychology and professional practice. Such a gap threatens the identity of psychology and also hinders the adequate development of its practical dimension. Scientific psychology mainly adopts a naturalistic outlook and calls for a subpersonal account of psychological phenomena. Opponents of such an approach to psychology maintain that human events have unique features and call for a personalistic account of them. The adoption of an approach underscoring the centrality of personhood—that acknowledges the specificity of the personal domain—may bridge the gap between science and practice, promoting the feasibility of practical psychology.
ISSN:0959-3543
1461-7447
DOI:10.1177/0959354321989434