Game theoretic-based modelling of Krishna waters dispute: equilibrium solutions by hypergame analysis

This paper presents a hyper game analysis of the Krishna waters dispute and demonstrates its potential to yield an equilibrium solution even in the face of uncertainty that may be plausible in the intent behind the apparent position taken by contending parties. The approach can accommodate the real-world conflict situation in which players conceal their negotiating strategies and develop perceptions about apparent positions that may be misperceived. The hypergame model of the conflict formulated to resolve the water-sharing dispute amongst the riparian states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, India. The paper demonstrates the potential of hypergame-based conflict resolution model to yield an equilibrium solution elegantly and which appears to have attributes of a “Fair and Equitable”” allocation. Hypergame is formulated by considering the perception of one player about the other ’players’ game. All the possible perceptions are taken, and the stability analysis is carried out. The results of the stability analysis show that Fair and equitable allocation is part of the equilibrium solution. Our analysis demonstrates that the game-theoretic technique can be applied to solve any real-world conflict. Any allocation made based on “Fairness and Equity” undoubtedly lead to the equilibrium solution as seen in the present work. Graphic abstract