The determinants of euro zone development: governments and fragile legitimacy
Euro zone economic governance is determined by governments, as member states resist ultimate transfers of authority to traditional supranational institutions. Neither crisis-driven institutional change nor later reform initiatives have altered this predominant role of domestic executives. The Commis...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of European public policy 2021-06, Vol.28 (6), p.886-893 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Euro zone economic governance is determined by governments, as member states resist ultimate transfers of authority to traditional supranational institutions. Neither crisis-driven institutional change nor later reform initiatives have altered this predominant role of domestic executives. The Commission cannot exercise ultimate decision-making powers in the domain of economic governance unilaterally. Instead it is co-opted to what could be called a collective euro zone executive of member state governments. The latter act by consensus or not at all. The democratic pathologies of European politics imply that governments remain reluctant to vacate their seats in euro zone governance. So far, governments have consistently opted for making collective decisions and have chosen to circumvent domestic actors when the euro was at risk. However, governments shy away from forward-looking reforms, which have redistributive implications and are beyond their future control, as they remain uncertain of their own legitimacy when deciding on the euro's future. |
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ISSN: | 1350-1763 1466-4429 |
DOI: | 10.1080/13501763.2020.1751680 |