The role of audit quality in preventing firm misreporting: empirical evidence from China

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the role of external audit quality in reducing firm misreporting practices.Design/methodology/approachData are gathered from a number of sources including the Osiris database and firms’ annual reports to construct a comprehensive data set containing financial and non-financial information of over 3,100 publicly listed firms in China during the period 2009–2017. A number of rigorous empirical specifications are utilized with the use of probit, logit and conditional logit regressions, as well as panel pooled OLS and fixed-effect estimators. The IV-2SLS, 2-step system GMM and difference-in-differences techniques are also employed to deal with the potential endogeneity bias to ensure the robustness of the empirical results.FindingsThe empirical results reveal that larger firms and firms having more tangible assets and greater retained earnings are more likely to employ a better-quality external auditor. Subsequently, higher audit quality leads to a deterioration in corporate misreporting. However, these results are not homogenous across firms. While we document similar findings in the case of non-state-owned firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) appear to have less tendency to hire a higher-quality auditor, and higher-quality auditors in turn do not play a significant role in reducing misreporting practices in SOEs.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to a better understanding of the mechanism to mitigate corporate misreporting practices. It is one of the few to empirically investigate auditor selections and the association between external audit quality and corporate misreporting practices in China.