Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance. •We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion in a social network.•Our model includes extrinsic incentives, intrinsic motivation, and reputation concerns.•Tax morale updating and reputation dynamics are the result of local interactions.•We simulate the model and characterise the steady state share of taxpayers.•A fiscal authority by targeting ‘central’ agents can increase tax compliance.