Cooperative games with partial information

Let ( N ,  v ) be a cooperative game with transferable utility and F ⊆ 2 N an arbitrary set system, where F represents the set of feasible coalitions S whose worths v ( S ) are known. We introduce a game ( N , v F ) as follows. If S ∈ F , then v F ( S ) = v ( S ) and otherwise v F ( S ) is defined s...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of game theory 2021-03, Vol.50 (1), p.297-309
Hauptverfasser:	Li, Daniel Li, Shan, Erfang
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Behavioral/Experimental Economics Cooperative games Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Games Graphs Operations Research/Decision Theory Original Paper Partial information Social and Behav. Sciences
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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