Model checking reveals design issues leading to spurious actuation of nuclear instrumentation and control systems

•Model checking revealed 57 I&C software design issues in nuclear power plants.•37% of the detected issues could have led to spurious actuation of I&C functions.•Spurious actuation can be detected under the presence of injected hardware failures.•Analysts need to focus on specifying properti...

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Veröffentlicht in:Reliability engineering & system safety 2021-01, Vol.205, p.107237, Article 107237
Hauptverfasser: Pakonen, Antti, Buzhinsky, I, Björkman, K
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:•Model checking revealed 57 I&C software design issues in nuclear power plants.•37% of the detected issues could have led to spurious actuation of I&C functions.•Spurious actuation can be detected under the presence of injected hardware failures.•Analysts need to focus on specifying properties for unwanted system behaviour. A spurious actuation of an industrial instrumentation and control (I&C) system is a failure mode where the system or its component inadvertently produces an operation without a justified reason to do so. Design issues leading to spurious failures are difficult to analyse, but pose a high risk for safety. Model checking is a formal verification method that can be used for exhaustive analysis of I&C systems. In this paper, we explain how formal properties that address spurious failures can be specified, and how model checking can then be used to verify I&C application logic designs based on vendor-specific function block diagrams. Based on over ten years of successful practical projects in the Finnish nuclear industry, we present 21 real-world design issues (representing 37% of all detected issues), each involving a systemic failure that could lead to spurious actuation of nuclear safety I&C. We then describe how random failures of the underlying hardware architecture—another cause for spurious actuation—can also be included in the models. With an experimental evaluation based on real-world nuclear industry models, we demonstrate that our method can be effectively used for the verification of single failure tolerance.
ISSN:0951-8320
1879-0836
DOI:10.1016/j.ress.2020.107237