Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games
We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness , individual rationality , super-additivity , and max consistency or complement consistency , respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is req...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of economic design 2020-12, Vol.24 (3-4), p.187-197 |
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| container_title | Review of economic design |
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| creator | Hokari, Toru Funaki, Yukihiko Sudhölter, Peter |
| description | We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by
non-emptiness
,
individual rationality
,
super-additivity
, and
max consistency
or
complement consistency
, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if
anonymity
is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with
anonymity
and
converse max consistency
on the domain of convex games. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6 |
| format | Article |
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non-emptiness
,
individual rationality
,
super-additivity
, and
max consistency
or
complement consistency
, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if
anonymity
is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with
anonymity
and
converse max consistency
on the domain of convex games.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1434-4742</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1434-4750</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><subject>Behavioral/Experimental Economics ; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Game Theory ; Microeconomics ; Original Paper ; Social and Behav. Sciences</subject><ispartof>Review of economic design, 2020-12, Vol.24 (3-4), p.187-197</ispartof><rights>Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2020</rights><rights>Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2020.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c494t-d56964bf5e4fef36d9c1e9604d0143e70e7bdf04b9823ea9857c97612c6d66bf3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c494t-d56964bf5e4fef36d9c1e9604d0143e70e7bdf04b9823ea9857c97612c6d66bf3</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-0198-2766</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27923,27924,41487,42556,51318</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Hokari, Toru</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Funaki, Yukihiko</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sudhölter, Peter</creatorcontrib><title>Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games</title><title>Review of economic design</title><addtitle>Rev Econ Design</addtitle><description>We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by
non-emptiness
,
individual rationality
,
super-additivity
, and
max consistency
or
complement consistency
, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if
anonymity
is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with
anonymity
and
converse max consistency
on the domain of convex games.</description><subject>Behavioral/Experimental Economics</subject><subject>Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Original Paper</subject><subject>Social and Behav. 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non-emptiness
,
individual rationality
,
super-additivity
, and
max consistency
or
complement consistency
, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if
anonymity
is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with
anonymity
and
converse max consistency
on the domain of convex games.</abstract><cop>Berlin/Heidelberg</cop><pub>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</pub><doi>10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6</doi><tpages>11</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0198-2766</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Springer Online Journals Complete; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Behavioral/Experimental Economics Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Microeconomics Original Paper Social and Behav. Sciences |
| title | Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games |
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