Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games
We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness , individual rationality , super-additivity , and max consistency or complement consistency , respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is req...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Review of economic design 2020-12, Vol.24 (3-4), p.187-197 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by
non-emptiness
,
individual rationality
,
super-additivity
, and
max consistency
or
complement consistency
, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if
anonymity
is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with
anonymity
and
converse max consistency
on the domain of convex games. |
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ISSN: | 1434-4742 1434-4750 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6 |