Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness , individual rationality , super-additivity , and max consistency or complement consistency , respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is req...

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Veröffentlicht in:Review of economic design 2020-12, Vol.24 (3-4), p.187-197
Hauptverfasser: Hokari, Toru, Funaki, Yukihiko, Sudhölter, Peter
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness , individual rationality , super-additivity , and max consistency or complement consistency , respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.
ISSN:1434-4742
1434-4750
DOI:10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6