Money, Bonds, and the Liquidity Trap

This paper examines a search model of money and public bonds in which coordination frictions lead to multiple, Pareto ranked equilibria. Whether money and bonds are substitutes or complements, is not a primitive of the economy, but an equilibrium outcome. There exists an equilibrium resembling a liq...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of money, credit and banking credit and banking, 2020-10, Vol.52 (7), p.1853-1867
Hauptverfasser: ARAUJO, LUIS, FERRARIS, LEO
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper examines a search model of money and public bonds in which coordination frictions lead to multiple, Pareto ranked equilibria. Whether money and bonds are substitutes or complements, is not a primitive of the economy, but an equilibrium outcome. There exists an equilibrium resembling a liquidity trap, in which money and bonds are perfect substitutes, interest rates are zero, and monetary policy is ineffective; and a superior equilibrium in which money and bonds are complements, interest rates are positive and monetary policy has a liquidity effect. On this view, the liquidity trap is a belief‐driven phenomenon.
ISSN:0022-2879
1538-4616
DOI:10.1111/jmcb.12697