On the Pragmatic Turn in Political Philosophy

Imagine some policy P about which a scholar said “The best way to help people escape from poverty would be P.” Is this a claim about political philosophy or economics? On the one hand, it seems to be an empirical statement, but there is a normative component as well. Besides the obvious normativity of “best,” there is the tacit implication that poverty is bad and that this is at least some reason to endorse P. But the fact that one can easily imagine either a political philosopher or an economist making the claim points to one reason for the recent growth of programs in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), programs of study which emphasize the interdisciplinary connection between political philosophy and the social sciences. Political philosophy is, of course, philosophy, which means it is a combination of analytic and normative tools, but since its subject matter involves human behavior and social institutions, empirical study of those seems like it should be relevant as well. Since political philosophy addresses questions about the social order, findings from the social sciences are surely relevant, chiefly from economics and political science. At first glance this seems directly analogous to the way philosophy of cognitive science would find relevance from work in neurology. But social scientists are themselves often beholden to normative priors which frame their methodology. The increased popularity of and growth of programs in PPE is therefore definitely beneficial both to the philosophers and to the social scientists who explore these issues. However, while the empirical is relevant, and, I would argue, essential, to good work in political philosophy, I would resist the suggestion that the empirical is exhaustive and that the philosophical is either superfluous or unwarranted.