The impact of political directors on corporate strategy for government-owned utilities: Evidence from Ontario's electricity distribution sector

We contribute to research on governance of state-owned electric utilities by examining the implications of oversight by independent versus ‘political’ directors for corporate strategy. While policy think-tanks often recommend that governments appoint independent professional directors to boards of state-owned corporations, governments sometimes select politicians who bring a politically-oriented perspective to their oversight duties. To examine the potential strategic consequences, we draw on a novel survey of 384 directors of municipally-owned local electricity distribution companies in Canada, of which about a third were elected municipal councillors and the remaining were independent business professionals. The survey solicited individual director views about strategic priorities, including mergers and acquisitions, business diversification, and corporate financing options. Our statistical analysis of the survey response data finds that political directors, after controlling for prior executive experience and organizational context, were more risk-tolerant on average than independent directors, as evidenced by a greater willingness to diversify into unregulated business activities and to acquire equity stakes in other utilities; but at the same time, they prioritized enhanced dividend payments to the municipal government over re-investment in the corporation, a potential constraint on future business growth. •Examines attitudes of political versus independent directors about utility strategy.•Novel survey of directors of municipally-owned electric utilities in Canada.•Political directors are more risk-tolerant on average than independent directors.