Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state be...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Theoretical economics 2020-07, Vol.15 (3), p.1175-1219 |
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| container_title | Theoretical economics |
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| creator | Sugaya, Takuo Yamamoto, Yuichi |
| description | We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3982/TE3820 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1555-7561 |
| ispartof | Theoretical economics, 2020-07, Vol.15 (3), p.1175-1219 |
| issn | 1555-7561 1933-6837 1555-7561 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Open Access; Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals |
| subjects | C72 C73 Cooperation Economic theory Equilibrium ex post equilibrium Games incomplete information individual learning Learning private monitoring Profitability Repeated game |
| title | Common learning and cooperation in repeated games |
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