Common learning and cooperation in repeated games

We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state be...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Theoretical economics 2020-07, Vol.15 (3), p.1175-1219
Hauptverfasser:	Sugaya, Takuo, Yamamoto, Yuichi
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	C72 C73 Cooperation Economic theory Equilibrium ex post equilibrium Games incomplete information individual learning Learning private monitoring Profitability Repeated game
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.
ISSN:	1555-7561 1933-6837 1555-7561
DOI:	10.3982/TE3820