The Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law by H Collins, G Lester and V Mantouvalou (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 368 pp (£75, hardcover). ISBN: 9780198825272

Questioning labour law's purpose and aim seems to have become somewhat of a formulaic opening for labour law edited collections.2 However, many of these edited collections (published overwhelmingly by Oxford University Press) agree that the normative foundations of labour law and theories of justice within the ordinary rules of private law (ie the contractual employment relationship) offer inadequate justice for employment relations. [...]the editors identify a consensus emerging throughout the chapters: that labour law needs a normative foundation that addresses, but is not necessarily beholden to, the ‘basic building blocks of division of labour’.3 The status quo employment contract, derived from contract law principles (libertarian, as above), in contrast does not accommodate key values of labour law. [...]employment law recognises only the contractual relationship, at the expense of human freedom and non-contractual relationality (in other words, personal autonomy and self-realisation). Putting forward not a new, but an important idea that if not included in the edited volume would leave a significant gap, Conaghan argues that ‘the feminist foregrounding of unpaid work is equally driven by concerns as to the value and utility of the analytical and conceptual frames through which labour law is commonly apprehended’.10 In a question that could be a guiding light for the entire volume, Conaghan asks, ‘should we be worried that our discipline remains significantly reliant upon a distinction of problematic origins, dubious rationality, and systematically gender-disadvantaging effects?’ Yes, she answers.