A Dilemma for Privacy as Control

Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such counterexamples—while individually resolvable—can be combined to yield a dilemma for control accounts of privacy. Furthermore, it is argued that it is implausible that contr...

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Veröffentlicht in:The journal of ethics 2020-06, Vol.24 (2), p.165-175
1. Verfasser: Lundgren, Björn
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such counterexamples—while individually resolvable—can be combined to yield a dilemma for control accounts of privacy. Furthermore, it is argued that it is implausible that control accounts of privacy can defend against this dilemma. Thus, it is concluded that we ought not define privacy in terms of control. Lastly, it is argued that since the concept of privacy is the object of the right to privacy if the former cannot be defined in terms of control, neither can the latter.
ISSN:1382-4554
1572-8609
DOI:10.1007/s10892-019-09316-z