Response to “Conceptualizing identification: A comment on Downs, Bowman, and Banks (2017)”

Replies to comments by E. McDade-Montez and R. A. Dore (see record 2020-23340-001) on the article by E. P. Downs et al. (see record 2017-54857-001). McDade-Montez and Dore are concerned that the Downs et al. assertion that identification can be considered a polythetic construct is premature for three reasons: (a) the lack of a formalized definition of identification, (b) conceptual challenges with identification being polythetic, and (c) empirical challenges with data supporting a polythetic architecture for identification (the Polythetic Identification Scale, or PID). We recognize our colleagues’ concerns on all three points and indeed, on some aspects of their critique, we feel that McDade-Montez and Dore and Downs et al. are more aligned in their thoughts than what might appear. On other points, we counter our colleagues’ concerns by offering clarifications to the Downs et al. article. Our responses to the three main points follow the general structure of McDade-Montez and Dore’s commentary. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)