COMMUNICATION AMONG VOTERS BENEFITS THE MAJORITY PARTY
How does communication among voters affect turnout? In a laboratory experiment, subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play communication treatments, relative to the no communication control, are public communication (subjects exchange public m...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Economic journal (London) 2019-02, Vol.129 (618), p.961-990 |
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| container_title | The Economic journal (London) |
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| creator | Palfrey, Thomas R. Pogorelskiy, Kirill |
| description | How does communication among voters affect turnout? In a laboratory experiment, subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play communication treatments, relative to the no communication control, are public communication (subjects exchange public messages through computers) and party communication (messages are public within one’s own party). Communication benefits the majority party by increasing its turnout margin, hence its winning probability. Party communication increases turnout; public communication decreases total turnout with a low voting cost. With communication, there is no support for Nash equilibrium and limited consistency with correlated equilibrium. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ecoj.12563 |
| format | Article |
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In a laboratory experiment, subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play communication treatments, relative to the no communication control, are public communication (subjects exchange public messages through computers) and party communication (messages are public within one’s own party). Communication benefits the majority party by increasing its turnout margin, hence its winning probability. Party communication increases turnout; public communication decreases total turnout with a low voting cost. 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In a laboratory experiment, subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play communication treatments, relative to the no communication control, are public communication (subjects exchange public messages through computers) and party communication (messages are public within one’s own party). Communication benefits the majority party by increasing its turnout margin, hence its winning probability. Party communication increases turnout; public communication decreases total turnout with a low voting cost. 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| identifier | ISSN: 0013-0133 |
| ispartof | The Economic journal (London), 2019-02, Vol.129 (618), p.961-990 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | Communication Computer mediated communication Computers Economic theory Equilibrium Game theory Kommunikation Politische Partei Voter behavior Voters Voting Wahlverhalten |
| title | COMMUNICATION AMONG VOTERS BENEFITS THE MAJORITY PARTY |
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