COMMUNICATION AMONG VOTERS BENEFITS THE MAJORITY PARTY

How does communication among voters affect turnout? In a laboratory experiment, subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play communication treatments, relative to the no communication control, are public communication (subjects exchange public m...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Economic journal (London) 2019-02, Vol.129 (618), p.961-990
Hauptverfasser: Palfrey, Thomas R., Pogorelskiy, Kirill
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:How does communication among voters affect turnout? In a laboratory experiment, subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play communication treatments, relative to the no communication control, are public communication (subjects exchange public messages through computers) and party communication (messages are public within one’s own party). Communication benefits the majority party by increasing its turnout margin, hence its winning probability. Party communication increases turnout; public communication decreases total turnout with a low voting cost. With communication, there is no support for Nash equilibrium and limited consistency with correlated equilibrium.
ISSN:0013-0133
1468-0297
DOI:10.1111/ecoj.12563