An Inglorious Revolution: The Syrian Opposition's Compromises
There is something puzzling about the failure of the Syrian revolution. One argument attributes it to the strength and resources of the Assad regime, which enjoyed the support of nearly all Syria’s minorities (Alawites, Christians, Druze, Ismailis and Shia), who make up at least 20-25 percent of the...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Middle East policy 2019-12, Vol.26 (4), p.113-130 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | There is something puzzling about the failure of the Syrian revolution. One argument attributes it to the strength and resources of the Assad regime, which enjoyed the support of nearly all Syria’s minorities (Alawites, Christians, Druze, Ismailis and Shia), who make up at least 20-25 percent of the population. The Kurds, a large minority (around 10 percent), remained neutral and never joined the opposition; they had their own political aspirations. The regime held on to the firm loyalty of its core elites and armed forces despite a few scattered defections. This was crucial for a government that mainly relied on coercion for control.1 Finally, the regime had very few, but committed, allies — Iran, Russia and Hezbollah — who ensured a continuous supply of money, arms and fighters. These combined factors explain why the revolutionary forces had great difficulty overthrowing the regime. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1061-1924 1475-4967 |
DOI: | 10.1111/mepo.12461 |