Shapley Value of a Cooperative Game with Fuzzy Set of Feasible Coalitions

Shapley Value of a Cooperative Game with Fuzzy Set of Feasible Coalitions

The paper investigates Shapley value of a cooperative game with fuzzy set of feasible coalitions. It is shown that the set of its values is a type 2 fuzzy set (a fuzzy set whose membership function takes fuzzy values) of special type. Furthermore, the corresponding membership function is given. Elem...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Cybernetics and systems analysis 2017-05, Vol.53 (3), p.432-440
Hauptverfasser: Mashchenko, S. O., Morenets, V. I.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Artificial Intelligence
Control
Economic models
Fuzzy sets
Game theory
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Processor Architectures
Reliability
Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems
Systems Theory
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The paper investigates Shapley value of a cooperative game with fuzzy set of feasible coalitions. It is shown that the set of its values is a type 2 fuzzy set (a fuzzy set whose membership function takes fuzzy values) of special type. Furthermore, the corresponding membership function is given. Elements of the support of this set are defined as particular Shapley values. The authors also propose the procedure of constructing these elements with maximum reliability of their membership and reliability of non-membership, not exceeding a given threshold.
ISSN:1060-0396
1573-8337
DOI:10.1007/s10559-017-9944-4