Capacities, Universality, and Singularity

Capacities, Universality, and Singularity

In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy of science 1997-12, Vol.64 (4), p.605-626
1. Verfasser: Glennan, Stuart S.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Ascriptions
Causal law
Causality
Causation
Electrons
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Metaphysics
Natural law
Philosophy
Physical theory
Science
Theory
Thrombosis
Universality
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creator Glennan, Stuart S.
description In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.
doi_str_mv 10.1086/392574
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source JSTOR Complete Journals; Periodicals Index Online
subjects Ascriptions
Causal law
Causality
Causation
Electrons
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Metaphysics
Natural law
Philosophy
Physical theory
Science
Theory
Thrombosis
Universality
title Capacities, Universality, and Singularity
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